Abstract
It has been widely assumed by the research community that the network reconnaissance attacks in IPv6 networks are unfeasible because they would take tremendous effort to perform address scanning of 2 64 hosts in an IPv6 subnet. However, recent research has revealed feasibility of these attacks by investigating a number of native IPv6 networks. The research concluded that an intelligent attacker could easily reduce the target search space by predicting the network host addressing schemes when performing the scanning. This indeed enhances security concerns and undermines the chances of IPv6 being deployed. This paper outlines the IPv6 addressing strategies currently used and proposes a new strategy to mitigate reconnaissance attacks. The new strategy is evaluated against some reconnaissance attack approaches and compared with some recent IPv6 addressing strategies. The experimental results confirm the effectiveness and validation of the addressing strategy in terms of the mitigation of reconnaissance attacks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 667-672 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Engineering Science and Technology, an International Journal |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2019 |
Keywords
- IPv4-IPv6 transition
- IPv6
- IPv6 address strategies
- Reconnaissance attacks
- Security
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
- Civil and Structural Engineering
- Biomaterials
- Mechanical Engineering
- Hardware and Architecture
- Fluid Flow and Transfer Processes
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Metals and Alloys