Ruling Family Political Connections and Risk Reporting

Evidence from the GCC

Ahmed Al-Hadi, Grantley Taylor, Khamis Hamed Al-Yahyaee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines whether the presence of ruling family members on boards of directors influences the extent and the quality of risk reporting. Based on a sample of publicly listed financial firms of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries between 2007 and 2011, our regression results show that ruling family board members reduce the quality and extent of risk disclosures. Firms with ruling family board members also disclose significantly less during periods of financial distress and when they are subject to higher levels of risk. We find that risk reporting is negatively associated with the existence of a ruling family director acting as the board chairperson, negatively associated with increasing proportions of ruling family directors on the board, and negatively associated with increasing numbers of board members who are connected to ruling family directors. Our results suggest that politically connected directors seize private benefits at the expense of their firms' shareholders. Our regression results hold after a series of robustness checks that control for endogeneity and for alternative measures of ruling family membership.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)504-524
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Journal of Accounting
Volume51
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2016

Fingerprint

Risk reporting
Political risk
Political connections
Risk disclosure
Expenses
Board of directors
Shareholders
Proportion
Endogeneity
Private benefits
Robustness
Gulf Cooperation Council
Financial distress

Keywords

  • Gulf Cooperation Council
  • Political connection
  • Risk disclosure
  • Ruling family director

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance

Cite this

Ruling Family Political Connections and Risk Reporting : Evidence from the GCC. / Al-Hadi, Ahmed; Taylor, Grantley; Al-Yahyaee, Khamis Hamed.

In: International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 51, No. 4, 01.12.2016, p. 504-524.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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