Market risk disclosures, corporate governance structure and political connections

evidence from GCC firms

Ahmed Al-Hadi, Khamis Hamed Al-Yahyaee, Syed Mujahid Hussain, Grantley Taylor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the joint effect of political connections, in the form of the royal family member on board, and corporate governance on the market risk disclosures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) financial firms from 2007 to 2011. Previous research suggest that politically connected firms reduce the level of transparency in the GCC. However, we find that better corporate governance improves transparency and can be used as an effective tool in curbing the potentially adverse impact of politically connected board members on firms’ transparency. Our results have important implications for policy makers and can be generalized to other emerging markets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-5
Number of pages5
JournalApplied Economics Letters
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Dec 30 2017

Fingerprint

Transparency
Corporate governance
Governance structure
Market risk
Political connections
Risk disclosure
Gulf Cooperation Council
Politicians
Emerging markets

Keywords

  • corporate governance
  • GCC
  • Market risk disclosures
  • political connections

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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