TY - JOUR
T1 - Does the WTO government procurement agreement deliver what it promises?
AU - Tas, Bedri Kamil Onur
AU - Dawar, Kamala
AU - Holmes, Peter
AU - Togan, Sübidey
N1 - Funding Information:
* Email: onurtas@etu.edu.tr (corresponding author) ** Email: K.Dawar@sussex.ac.uk *** Email: p.holmes@sussex.ac.uk † Email: togan@bilkent.edu.tr We would like to thank L. Alan Winters and two anonymous referees for suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Sergio Alessandrini and Bernard Hoekman for valuable comments, and acknowledge gratefully the financial support from Forum Euromediterranéen des Instituts Sciences Economiques (FEMISE), supported by the European Commission. The views expressed in the paper, however, do not necessarily represent the official position of the Commission nor that of FEMISE.
Publisher Copyright:
© Bedri Kamil Onur Taş et al.
PY - 2019/10/1
Y1 - 2019/10/1
N2 - We examine the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) on government procurement practices in the European Union (EU). We analyse empirically whether the WTO GPA is effective in promoting non-discriminatory, open, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective government procurement. To study this question, we use a unique data set recently released by the EU, covering more than three million tenders conducted in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and Macedonia during the years 2006-2016. We find that the WTO GPA promotes competition by increasing the probability of awarding a contract to a foreign firm. In addition, the WTO GPA significantly lowers corruption risk by decreasing the number of contracts with single bidders, and by decreasing total number of wins by a single firm. Finally, the WTO GPA fosters cost-effective public procurement by lowering the probability that the procurement price is higher than estimated cost.
AB - We examine the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) on government procurement practices in the European Union (EU). We analyse empirically whether the WTO GPA is effective in promoting non-discriminatory, open, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective government procurement. To study this question, we use a unique data set recently released by the EU, covering more than three million tenders conducted in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and Macedonia during the years 2006-2016. We find that the WTO GPA promotes competition by increasing the probability of awarding a contract to a foreign firm. In addition, the WTO GPA significantly lowers corruption risk by decreasing the number of contracts with single bidders, and by decreasing total number of wins by a single firm. Finally, the WTO GPA fosters cost-effective public procurement by lowering the probability that the procurement price is higher than estimated cost.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055476968&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85055476968&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S1474745618000290
DO - 10.1017/S1474745618000290
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85055476968
SN - 1474-7456
VL - 18
SP - 609
EP - 634
JO - World Trade Review
JF - World Trade Review
IS - 4
ER -