Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming

Mohammad R. Hesamzadeh, D. Biggar, N. Hosseinzadeh, P. J. Wolfs

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game are located through a characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different perspectives.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09 - Calgary, AB, Canada
Duration: Jul 26 2009Jul 30 2009

Other

Other2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09
CountryCanada
CityCalgary, AB
Period7/26/097/30/09

Keywords

  • Multilevel programming
  • Oligopoly electricity market
  • Transmission augmentation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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