A leader-followers model of transmission augmentation for considering strategic behaviours of generating companies in energy markets

M. R. Hesamzadeh; N. Hosseinzadeh; P. J. Wolfs

doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2009.11.008

A leader-followers model of transmission augmentation for considering strategic behaviours of generating companies in energy markets

M. R. Hesamzadeh, N. Hosseinzadeh^*, P. J. Wolfs

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper suggests an integrated mathematical framework developed based on the leader-followers game for augmentation of transmission networks. Transmission Network Service Provider moves first and designs the horizon year transmission system. Generating Companies compete for having the highest share from the energy market and they find their equilibrium point using the Nash equilibrium concept. Finally, Market Management Company receives the planning schedule of transmission system and the energy offer prices and clears the market. In addition to the exact mathematical modelling of the interested players of transmission planning problem, the methodology can design the future transmission system not only for improving the system social welfare but also for encouraging competition among horizon year generating companies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	358-367
Number of pages	10
Journal	International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems
Volume	32
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2009.11.008
Publication status	Published - Jun 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Leader-followers game
Strategic GenCos
Transmission augmentation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1016/j.ijepes.2009.11.008

Cite this

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title = "A leader-followers model of transmission augmentation for considering strategic behaviours of generating companies in energy markets",

abstract = "This paper suggests an integrated mathematical framework developed based on the leader-followers game for augmentation of transmission networks. Transmission Network Service Provider moves first and designs the horizon year transmission system. Generating Companies compete for having the highest share from the energy market and they find their equilibrium point using the Nash equilibrium concept. Finally, Market Management Company receives the planning schedule of transmission system and the energy offer prices and clears the market. In addition to the exact mathematical modelling of the interested players of transmission planning problem, the methodology can design the future transmission system not only for improving the system social welfare but also for encouraging competition among horizon year generating companies.",

keywords = "Leader-followers game, Strategic GenCos, Transmission augmentation",

author = "Hesamzadeh, {M. R.} and N. Hosseinzadeh and Wolfs, {P. J.}",

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AU - Hosseinzadeh, N.

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Y1 - 2010/6

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AB - This paper suggests an integrated mathematical framework developed based on the leader-followers game for augmentation of transmission networks. Transmission Network Service Provider moves first and designs the horizon year transmission system. Generating Companies compete for having the highest share from the energy market and they find their equilibrium point using the Nash equilibrium concept. Finally, Market Management Company receives the planning schedule of transmission system and the energy offer prices and clears the market. In addition to the exact mathematical modelling of the interested players of transmission planning problem, the methodology can design the future transmission system not only for improving the system social welfare but also for encouraging competition among horizon year generating companies.

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KW - Strategic GenCos

KW - Transmission augmentation

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A leader-followers model of transmission augmentation for considering strategic behaviours of generating companies in energy markets

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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