Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions

Ilke Onur, Bedri Kamil Onur Tas*

*المؤلف المقابل لهذا العمل

نتاج البحث: المساهمة في مجلةArticleمراجعة النظراء

5 اقتباسات (Scopus)


This paper empirically identifies the optimal number of bidders to achieve the lowest procurement prices in public procurement auctions. We examine a unique data set that covers all Turkish government procurement auctions comprising more than half a million observations for the period 2005–2012. We present a novel and easy-to-implement method to investigate the number of bidders required for the public procurement markets to be competitive. Our results suggest that procurement costs decrease until six to eight bidders. Policy makers can employ the method to investigate the optimal number of bidders and design policies to promote competition. Moreover, policy makers can also make use of the optimal numbers as focal points to inspect whether competitive efficiency is achieved in public procurement auctions.

اللغة الأصليةEnglish
الصفحات (من إلى)595-617
عدد الصفحات23
دوريةInternational Tax and Public Finance
مستوى الصوت26
رقم الإصدار3
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرPublished - يونيو 15 2019

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