Analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in public procurement auctions

Bedri Kamil Onur Tas*

*المؤلف المقابل لهذا العمل

نتاج البحث: المساهمة في مجلةArticleمراجعة النظراء

ملخص

We empirically investigate differences in cost-effectiveness of public procurement auctions that are won by entrants and incumbents. We use a unique data set that covers all Turkish public procurement auctions for the years 2004 to 2010. We find that procurement prices of auctions won by entrants are significantly lower. More than half of the entrants cannot survive in the public procurement market and cannot win more than one auction. Our results indicate that policymakers should cultivate competition and promote entry in public procurement auctions.

اللغة الأصليةEnglish
الصفحات (من إلى)187-204
عدد الصفحات18
دوريةFinanzArchiv
مستوى الصوت75
رقم الإصدار2
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرPublished - 2019
منشور خارجيًانعم

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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