ملخص
This paper studies a horizontal fare-pricing competition between two airlines having a single flight leg. Two distinct scenarios are considered. First, the two airlines price competition for the pre-committed booking limits is analysed. The problem is studied under deterministic price sensitive demands. The existence of unique pricing strategies at Nash equilibrium is shown. In the second scenario, a joint seat allocation and fare-pricing competition model for stochastic demand is proposed. A numerical analysis is presented to demonstrate the impacts of various market conditions on the payoffs, booking limits and pricing strategies of the competing airlines.
اللغة الأصلية | English |
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الصفحات (من إلى) | 42-62 |
عدد الصفحات | 21 |
دورية | International Journal of Revenue Management |
مستوى الصوت | 2 |
رقم الإصدار | 1 |
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء | |
حالة النشر | Published - 2008 |
منشور خارجيًا | نعم |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
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